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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 09-2827 
 ___________ 
 
 DAVID PEPE WILSON, 
        Appellant 
 
 v. 
 
SHARON M. BURKS, Unit Manager; 
MARK A. KRYSEVIG, Superintendent of SCI Cresson; 
KRISTEN P. REISINGER, Chief Grievance Officer, Department of Corrections 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 07-CV-00293) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 5, 2011 
 Before:  SCIRICA, SMITH and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges 
 
 (Opinion filed: April 14, 2011) 
 
 ___________ 
 
 OPINION 
 ___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 David Pepe Wilson, an inmate at SCI-Cresson, filed a civil rights complaint in the 
United States District Court for the Western District of Pennsylvania.  The District Court 
dismissed certain defendants, and later granted summary judgment in favor of the one 
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remaining defendant.  Wilson then filed a post-decision motion, which the District Court 
denied.  Wilson filed a notice of appeal.  After Wilson filed his opening brief, Appellees 
filed a motion to dismiss the appeal.  The motion and Wilson‟s response were referred to 
this panel, and the Appellees were directed to file a brief.  After having considered the 
motions and briefs, we find that we have jurisdiction to consider the issues Wilson raises 
on appeal, and we will remand the case for further proceedings in the District Court. 
I. 
Wilson is serving a sentence of fifty-five (55) to 110 years in prison at S.C.I. 
Cresson.  He filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he was 
exposed to second-hand smoke, or environmental tobacco smoke (“ETS”), from inmates 
in his block in violation of his Eighth Amendment rights.  He asserted that he could not 
identify the inmates who are smoking in his block because he cannot see other inmates 
from his cell.  In the past, he had reported smoking by his cell-mate, which the officers 
did nothing about.  Wilson noted that he had received radiation treatment at prison for 
problems with his thyroid gland, and that his doctors had advised him to avoid exposure 
to ETS.  He claimed that the defendants have been deliberately indifferent to his health 
needs and that his grievance requests for a transfer to SCI-Chester, a facility where all 
smoking is banned (and cigarettes are not sold at the commissary), had been either 
ignored or denied. 
On the defendants‟ motion, the District Court dismissed the Complaint as to 
defendants Krysevig and Reisinger because Wilson failed to show their personal 
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involvement.
1
  Defendant Burks filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that 
Wilson could not establish deliberate indifference on her part because she fully 
investigated Wilson‟s grievance and ensured him that any inmates violating the smoking 
ban on his block would be disciplined.  The District Court directed the parties to provide 
evidence quantifying the amount of ETS to which Wilson is exposed and the level of 
exposure that would pose a quantifiable risk to Wilson‟s health given his thyroid 
condition. 
Upon consideration of all of the parties‟ submissions, the Magistrate Judge issued 
a Report recommending that summary judgment be granted in favor of Burks.  Wilson 
filed objections.  On April 15, 2009, the District Court overruled Wilson‟s timely 
objections, adopted the Magistrate Judge‟s Report, and entered judgment for defendant 
Burks.  On April 24, 2009, Wilson filed a motion titled “Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e),” which the District Court 
denied.  This appeal followed. 
II. 
Appellees have filed a motion to dismiss/quash the appeal.  Appellees argue as 
follows:  (1) Wilson‟s notice of appeal mentions only the June 1, 2009 order denying his 
post-decision motion; (2) that order construed Wilson‟s motion to alter or amend 
judgment as a motion filed pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure; (3) an appeal from an order denying a Rule 60(b) motion does not bring up 
                                                 
1
 Wilson‟s brief does not raise any challenge to this order; we thus do not address it.  F.D.I.C. 
v. Deglau, 207 F.3d 153, 169-70 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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the underlying judgment for review; but (4) Wilson‟s brief only challenges the underlying 
(April 15, 2009) order.  Appellees argue that this Court thus lacks jurisdiction to consider 
the only issues that are raised.  Wilson filed a response in opposition to dismissal. 
Appellees‟ argument in support of dismissing the appeal rests primarily on the 
District Court‟s characterization of Wilson‟s motion as a Rule 60(b) motion.   Appellees 
properly cite Browder v. Director, Department of Corrections of Illinois, 434 U.S. 257, 
263 n.7 (1978), for the proposition that the appeal of the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion 
does not bring up the underlying judgment for review.  However, we find that the District 
Court mischaracterized the motion. 
As noted above, Wilson‟s motion was titled, “Motion to Alter or Amend 
Judgment, Under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e).”  We recognize that the 
title of the motion is not dispositive.  “[T]he function of the motion, and not the caption, 
dictates which Rule is applicable.”  United States v. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d 282, 287-88 (3d 
Cir. 2003).  The District Court order noted that Wilson‟s motion quoted Rule 60‟s 
language regarding “misrepresentation,” and denied the motion “as he fails to 
demonstrate a misrepresentation that he claims.”  Dist. Ct. Order, dkt. #59.  It is true that 
Wilson‟s motion quotes some of Rule 60‟s language, including language concerning a 
court‟s ability to relieve a party from a final judgment because of misrepresentation.  But 
Wilson seems to misunderstand what Rule 60 means by “misrepresentation”:  he states 
that the “misrepresentation” involved in the case was the failure to provide him with legal 
representation.  See dkt. #56 (“The misrepresentation, in a indigent person, who knows 
little or nothing at all . . . [a]nd plaintiff had made repeated efforts to obtain a lawyer on 
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his own, as well as requested this Honorable court to please appoint him legal counsel.”).  
His attached memorandum of law also complains about the District Court‟s failure to 
appoint counsel, and its failure to hold his pro se filings to less strict standards.  The 
memorandum of law further disputes the District Court‟s analysis of the evidence 
regarding the prevalence of ETS in his cell block.  See dkt. #57.  We conclude that the 
motion is best construed as an attempt to relitigate the District Court‟s purported legal 
error in failing to appoint counsel, and its purported failure to exercise a relaxed standard 
in evaluating pro se filings.  These issues have nothing to do with “misrepresentation” 
and were properly raised in a motion filed pursuant to Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure.  Cf. Fiorelli, 337 F.3d at 288 (movant‟s allegation that District Court 
should have held an evidentiary hearing on his claim is allegation of error of law properly 
brought in Rule 59(e) motion). 
Because Wilson‟s motion in the District Court was a valid Rule 59(e) motion, we 
have jurisdiction to consider all the issues Wilson raises on appeal.  A timely Rule 59(e) 
motion tolls the time to appeal from the original judgment.  Wilson‟s Rule 59(e) motion 
was filed within ten days of the order granting summary judgment,
2
 and his notice of 
appeal was timely filed after the Court denied his motion.  Although his notice of appeal 
mentions only the June 1, 2009 order, we have held that we “can exercise jurisdiction 
over orders not specified in the Notice of Appeal if:  (1) there is a connection between the 
                                                 
2
 At the time in question, the Rule required that a movant file a motion for 
reconsideration within ten days; the Rule was amended effective December 1, 2009 to 
change the time for filing a timely motion to alter or amend judgment from 10 days to 28 
days. 
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specified and unspecified orders; (2) the intention to appeal the unspecified order is 
apparent; and (3) the opposing party is not prejudiced and has a full opportunity to brief 
the issues.”  Sulima v. Tobyhanna Army Depot, 602 F.3d 177, 184 (3d Cir. 2010) 
(internal quotation and citation omitted).    
Wilson‟s Rule 59(e) motion displays an attempt to relitigate, at least in part, the 
April 15, 2009 order denying summary judgment.  But even if Wilson‟s intent to appeal 
the earlier order is not entirely clear from the Rule 59(e) motion, then the intent is at least 
clear from his “Concise Statement of Matters” attached to his notice of appeal.  That 
statement, quoted below verbatim, clearly challenges the merits of the summary 
judgment order: 
[T]he U.S. District Court have failed to see that the plaintiff have already 
proven to this court, that the defendant had already stated, that there are 
always going to be inmates who tend to break the rules, as well as this 
facility stating that even with the best of intentions, that the DOC staff 
cannot prevent inmates from violating institutional policies, of this 
secondhand smoke, that is unconstitutionally exposing the plaintiff to 
environmental tobacco smoke, under the Eighth Amendment, Farmer v. 
Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994). 
The Appellees are not prejudiced by our review of the earlier order, as they were at least 
partially on notice through Wilson‟s Rule 59(e) motion and his notice of appeal that he 
intended to challenge the earlier ruling, and they were certainly on notice after reading 
his opening brief.  Elfman Motors, Inc. v. Chrysler Corp., 567 F.2d 1252, 1254 (3d 
Cir.1977) (per curiam) (“if from the notice of appeal itself and the subsequent 
proceedings on appeal it appears that the appeal was intended to have been taken from an 
unspecified judgment order or part thereof, the notice may be construed as bringing up 
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the unspecified order for review”).  We thus hold that we have jurisdiction to consider the 
issues Wilson raises in his brief. 
III. 
We exercise plenary review over the District Court‟s order granting summary 
judgment.  See DeHart v. Horn, 390 F.3d 262, 267 (3d Cir. 2004).  Summary judgment is 
proper where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party 
and drawing all inferences in favor of that party, there is no genuine issue of material fact 
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(2) (2009) (amended December 2010); Reedy v. Evanson, 615 F.3d 197, 210 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  
In order to show an Eighth Amendment “conditions of confinement” violation, a 
plaintiff must show that the defendants knew of and disregarded an excessive risk to his 
health.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837.  “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which 
the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must 
also draw the inference.”  Id.  Liability based on exposure to ETS requires proof of:  (1) 
exposure to unreasonably high levels of ETS contrary to contemporary standards of 
decency; and (2) deliberate indifference by the authorities to the exposure to ETS.  
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 35 (1993).  
Here, the Magistrate Judge found that there was no evidence that defendant Burks 
was deliberately indifferent to the risk of Wilson‟s exposure to ETS.  The Magistrate 
Judge noted that SCI-Cresson has had a non-smoking policy in place since 2000 and that 
there have been occasional violations of the policy despite the prison‟s best efforts to stop 
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smoking in unauthorized areas through disciplinary action.  Specifically, the Magistrate 
Judge cited to record evidence that, of the total of 2442 disciplinary citations issued at the 
prison in 2007 and 2008, only 56 were for smoking.  He inferred from the small number 
of disciplinary actions that the incidence of second-hand smoke resulting from 
impermissible smoking was rare.  While the Magistrate Judge acknowledged the 
difficulty Wilson had in identifying the particular inmate(s) responsible for smoking in 
his block (because Wilson could not see or because he feared retaliation), he found that 
Wilson failed “to identify one instance when one inmate smoked one cigarette, much less  
one specific incident where defendant Burks failed to enforce the no-smoking policy.”  
Report at 2.  The Magistrate Judge specifically noted that the affidavits Wilson submitted 
failed to provide such evidence.    
As for whether the level of Wilson‟s exposure to ETS was unreasonably high, the 
Magistrate Judge found inadequate Wilson‟s general statements that tobacco smoke 
“lingers in the air” on the block “for hours.”  Id. at 3.  He also noted defendant Burks‟ 
inability to locate any accepted scientific literature on what comprised an 
epidemiologically significant level of second-hand smoke, and discounted the “popular 
literature” from the American Lung Association (submitted by Wilson) because it failed 
to make any scientifically verifiable correlation between level of exposure and risk.  Id.  
Although the Magistrate Judge readily acknowledged that the clinically significant level 
of exposure to second-hand smoke might be lower for Wilson than for other inmates 
because of his thyroid condition he stated that “general allegations that there is „some‟ 
ETS in prison are always insufficient to create an issue of fact as to the objective element 
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of a Helling v. McKinney claim.”  Id. 
We find, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to Wilson, that 
there is a genuine issue of material fact concerning whether Burks was deliberately 
indifferent to the risk of Wilson‟s exposure to unreasonably high levels of ETS.  The 
affidavits of Wilson‟s current and former cell-mates call into question the Magistrate 
Judge‟s finding that Wilson failed “to identify one instance when one inmate smoked one 
cigarette, much less  one specific incident where defendant Burks failed to enforce the 
no-smoking policy.”  Report at 2.  Both affiants witnessed second-hand smoke “lingering 
everyday on the block,” suggesting that Wilson‟s exposure to ETS was a pervasive, 
everyday affair.  See Wilson‟s Response to District Court Order, Dkt. #49, Exhs. A and B 
at ¶ 3.  Moreover, the affidavits raise a factual issue as to whether the small number of 
disciplinary citations issued for violations of the non-smoking policy meant that exposure 
to second-hand smoke was occasional (which is what the Magistrate Judge inferred) or 
whether the smoking ban was just poorly enforced.  Here, the affiants support the latter 
view, attesting that “there isn‟t any kind of smoking allowed on any of the blocks, here at 
SCI-Cresson.  But that isn‟t stopping inmates from doing it in here.”  Id. at ¶ 4.  Indeed, 
in her answer to Wilson‟s grievance, Burks stated that “[a]lthough D-unit is a no-smoking 
unit, there are always going to be inmates who tend to break the rules.”  Dkt. #37, Exhibit 
2, at page 32 of 39.  Wilson‟s grievance also alerted Burks to the fact that he had been 
given radiation treatment, and that he had been told by a doctor that he should not be 
around people who are smoking.  Id. at page 31 of 39. 
Of course, we express no opinion on the merits of the claim.  We do conclude, 
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however, that Wilson has raised a genuine issue of material fact regarding his Eighth 
Amendment claim.  We will therefore vacate the District Court order and remand for 
further proceedings.  The District Court may wish to appoint counsel on remand.
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 Appellees‟ motion to dismiss is denied.  
